Are you confused about risks to privacy when everything from keystrokes to footsteps is being monitored? The Federal Trade Commission is confused too. In January they released a 55-page paper summarizing results of discussions with privacy experts about the Internet of Things, plus some recommendations. After a big build-up citing all sorts of technological and business threats, the report kind of fizzles out. Legislation specific to the IoT was rejected, but several suggestions for “general privacy legislation” such as requiring security on devices.
Sensors and controls are certainly popping up everywhere, so the FTC investigation comes at an appropriate time. My senator, Ed Markey, who has been a leader in telecom and technology for decades in Congress, recently released a report focused on automobiles. But the same concerns show up everywhere in various configurations. In this article I’ll focus on health care, and on the dilemma of security in that area.
No doubt about it, pacemakers and other critical devices can be hacked. It could be a movie: in Scene 1 a non-descript individual is moving through a crowded city street, thumbing over a common notepad. In Scene 2, later, numerous people fall to the ground as their pacemakers fail. They just had the bad luck to be in the vicinity of the individual with the notepad, who implanted their implants with malicious code that took effect later.
But here are the problems with requiring more security. First, security in computers almost always rests on encryption, which leads to an increase in the size of the data being protected. The best-known FTC case regarding device security, where they forced changes for cameras used in baby monitors, was appropriate for these external devices that could absorb the extra overhead. But increased data size leads to an increase in memory use, which in turn requires more storage and computing power on a small embedded device, as well as more transmission time over the network. In the end, devices may have to be heavier and more costly, serious barriers to adoption.
Furthermore, software always has bugs. Some lie dormant for years, like the notorious Heartbleed bug in the very software that web sites around the world depend on for encrypted communications. To provide security fixes, a manufacturer has to make it easy for embedded devices to download updated software–and any bug in that procedure leaves a channel for attack.
Perhaps there is a middle ground, where devices could be designed to accept updates only from particular computers in particular geographic locations. A patient would then be notified through email or a text message to hike it down to the doctor, where the fix could be installed. And the movie scene where malicious code gets downloaded from the street would be less likely to happen.
In the next part of this article I’ll suggest how the FTC and device manufacturers can engage the public to make appropriate privacy and security decisions.